Counter Apologetics:

Is there a counter apologetic topic you'd like to hear us discuss? --

I'd really like to hear you guys deconstruct Gödel's ontological proof. Explain what it says and why it's not compelling. I mean, there are a few things I use to argue against the general ontological argument as William Lane Craig puts it:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Craig claims that "a maximally great being" is intuitively coherent, but I disagree. You can only ever have a subjectively great entity according to some arbitrary set of measurements. For instance, why is this maximally great being not maximally content, thus having no impetus to create anything?

But when it gets to Gödel's formalised version, I'm left without the tools to address it, or even really understand it. I'd like to hear what you guys have to say about it.

EDIT: Oh, and if you mention me, Canberra is pronounced "kan-bruh".

Oh, and this was supposed to go into "Counter-Apologetics", which I though was a sub-forum, rather than a single thread.

I don't quite remember the deconstruction of this argument (been sick most of the day, just now got up enough energy to get up), but one my simple refutes is pointing that even if we pretend this proves god, it's a hell of a leap to the god of abraham, which it provides no justification for.

politas wrote:I'd really like to hear you guys deconstruct Gödel's ontological proof. Explain what it says and why it's not compelling. I mean, there are a few things I use to argue against the general ontological argument as William Lane Craig puts it:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Craig claims that "a maximally great being" is intuitively coherent, but I disagree. You can only ever have a subjectively great entity according to some arbitrary set of measurements. For instance, why is this maximally great being not maximally content, thus having no impetus to create anything?

But when it gets to Gödel's formalised version, I'm left without the tools to address it, or even really understand it. I'd like to hear what you guys have to say about it.

Without trying to insult Gödel (but with no such decorum directed toward William Lane Craig), I have always found the ontological arguments for God's existence among the most asinine thinking I've ever come across. It sounds like it was burped out by a recalcitrant 8th grader who is trying to get out of doing his math homework. Take a look at the glaring errors in logical argument:

1. He fails to define the term, "maximally great being," making the claim unfalsifiable from the outset. Everything after that is moot, but I will continue for argument's sake.
   
2. He fails to differentiate between plausibility and possibility. Everything after that is also moot, but I will again continue for argument's sake.
   
3. In steps 2-5, he leaps to the conclusion that a maximally great being MUST (by definition, which he hasn't given) be in existence somewhere, then (another leap) everywhere. All of this is "begging the question," aka, circular reasoning. You can't assume a premise in order to prove a premise.
   

Let's try this with a little word replacement:

1. It is possible that a maximally great door hinge exists.
   
2. If it is possible that a maximally great door hinge exists, then a maximally great door hinge exists in some possible world.
   
3. If a maximally great door hinge exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
   
4. If a maximally great door hinge exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
   
5. If a maximally great door hinge exists in the actual world, then a maximally great door hinge exists.
   
6. Therefore, a maximally great door hinge exists.
   

Now, I assert why my perception of a truly great door hinge would perhaps greatly differ from the great door hinges others would swing their doors by. As a matter of fact, we would choose the door hinge based on our need, which is exactly what theists do: They choose to their "god" by what THEY need. And just because I can imagine a truly great door hinge, it doesn't follow that it necessarily exists. I may just have a superb imagination.

So Gödel has locked himself into a logical closet. But if he could get his unique maximally great door hinge, perhaps he could find one that swung both ways so he could escape the intellectual trap in which he encased himself.

This argument is an asinine string of non sequitirs.

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

How are we defining a "maximally great being?" Are we talking great as in size, intelligence, complexity, wisdom, all of the above? If WLC is not going to define his terms then he isn't really talking about anything at all.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

Again, define "world." If we're not going to define the maximally great being, or the MGB, then how can we possibly know that he exists in a possible world. Plus, he's doing a very sly jump from the realm of mere possibility (If it is possible...) to blanket assertion of existence (then MGB exists...). Just because something is possible does not make it so. I could weave an afghan or a basket. There is that potential, but that doesn't mean that NedStarked-weaved baskets and afghans exist.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

Utterly ridiculous. That's like saying if an orange exists on my dining room table, it must exist on every dining room table. Plus, I may point out again, we haven't proven that MGB exists, we just have been given a defacto assertion that he does with no evidence to back it up.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

I won't even bother. This train of thought was derailed at step #1.

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

A redundant statement.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Basically this argument can be boiled down to two steps:

1. It's possible that God exists.
2. Therefore, God exists.

If only that worked in other areas of life.

1. It's possible that I will win the lottery tomorrow.
2. Therefore, I will win the lottery tomorrow.

Even if this were a sound argument for something "out there," it would only prove deism. WLC is a Christian apologist, so even if he did make a coherent argument for the existence of God, it would still be a logical leap to say "MGB exists because of A, B, C, and D, therefore MGB is Jesus Christ, who just happens to be the God I already worship, fancy that."

I don't know why the apologist movement has been flocking to this William Lane Craig character. He offers nothing new and nothing sound to the apologetics argument, yet he's lauded as the smartest man in Christendom for simply regurgitating a few very old ideas.

NedStark wrote:

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

Utterly ridiculous. That's like saying if an orange exists on my dining room table, it must exist on every dining room table.

I agree that this point sounds like completely absurd nonsense. However, it turns out in formal logic systems, that many things which seem absurd can be proven to be logically true. Gödel was phenomenally good at formal systems and the intricacies of logic. I'm not willing to discount his logic simply because it seems absurd. I want someone who understands modal logic to explain it and critique it.

Personally, I think the first premise holds the richest source of problems for the argument. Yes, a "maximally great being" is possible, and maybe even necessary, but we need to turn the statement around and ask what are the possible maximums?

Is Omniscience even possible? Well, Heisenberg proved that it really isn't. It's not possible to know everything. It's possible for some entity to know more than any other entity. In fact, it's a logical necessity that somewhere there is an entity who holds more knowledge than any other entity that exists in the universe, on a simple measurement of knowledge quantity. That doesn't mean that entity would know everything, though. It doesn't even mean that entity would know everything which is known by other entities. The universe as a whole contains all the information in the universe. It's quite simply impossible for anything less than the universe to contain all of that information. It just can't fit. The only truly accurate model of the universe is the universe.

Is omnipotence possible? Well, I think that omnipotence is an inherently self-contradictory term. How can something be omnipotent? The whole "can God create a rock so heavy He cannot lift it?" conundrum indicates the problem. It is not possible for an irresistible force and an immovable object to exist in the same universe, simply by the definition of those two terms. And if omnipotence does not include both of those characteristics, then can it really be said to be all-powerful? I would say not.

So what does that leave us with? A "maximally great being" which is greater than any other being that exists in the universe, but only by degree, not by difference. That's a very big step away from any kind of god I've ever heard described.

i would point you towards the SAE's explanation of the issue:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/#GodOntArg

Thought to reply to this in some detail, but having read NH Baritone's reply, I see there's no need.

Really, every version of an ontological argument I've seen regarding God's existence has been utterly inane.

When essentially the same argument could be used to "prove" the existence of anything and everything conceivable, like, say, the most perfect imaginable purple, pink-spotted, flying monkeys, one HAS to see that there's something fishy with the argument.

Stegocephalian wrote:Thought to reply to this in some detail, but having read NH Baritone's reply, I see there's no need.

Really, every version of an ontological argument I've seen regarding God's existence has been utterly inane.

When essentially the same argument could be used to "prove" the existence of anything and everything conceivable, like, say, the most perfect imaginable purple, pink-spotted, flying monkeys, one HAS to see that there's something fishy with the argument.

I agree. The lack of clear definition of God attributes means that one can use this line of reasoning for just about anything. With equal logical authority you can claim that God is a can of Spam floating somewhere in the Pleadies cluster.

Stegocephalian wrote:When essentially the same argument could be used to "prove" the existence of anything and everything conceivable, like, say, the most perfect imaginable purple, pink-spotted, flying monkeys, one HAS to see that there's something fishy with the argument.

A purple pink-spotted flying monkey? I want one of those!!
Oh... I see... You're saying they don't exist...

Damn you Stegocephalian for getting my hopes up!

the difference between other versions of the ontological argument and godel's is that, assuming you buy into modal logic, his conclusions do necessarily follow from the premises. that's not to suggest in any way that godel's proofs work (there were several). they don't. but the reason they don't is complicated, and, unless you have a background in modal logic (actually, even then), it's difficult to point out where godel goes wrong. most critics conclude that the issue boils down to a fuzzy understanding of positive properties, a concept on which godel makes extensive use in his proofs, though how that works is complicated.
at any rate, it's an interesting subject if you're into things like modal logic.

blacklens wrote:

Stegocephalian wrote:When essentially the same argument could be used to "prove" the existence of anything and everything conceivable, like, say, the most perfect imaginable purple, pink-spotted, flying monkeys, one HAS to see that there's something fishy with the argument.

A purple pink-spotted flying monkey? I want one of those!!
Oh... I see... You're saying they don't exist...

Damn you Stegocephalian for getting my hopes up!

Not all hope is lost - now you've just got to find a mad scientist with a thing for weird genetic experimentation and you'll be set...

Jim wrote:...the reason they don't is complicated, and, unless you have a background in modal logic (actually, even then), it's difficult to point out where godel goes wrong...

Well you're not wrong. I was just looking at some stuff on modal logic - I stopped before I had a stroke.

Jim, a question for you - There are three but the real question is the first one you come too. The others are rhetorical. Because I could.

You said that "his conclusions do necessarily follow from the premises" - so I guess that the means the argument is 'valid' within the given modal system. Putting aside the ultimate truth or falsehood of Gödel's argument for a moment; what I don't understand is the relevance of 'proofs' like this have for the every-man.

We take a language. We define certain word meanings. We construct a set of rules about how words operate and interact with each other. What has been achieved other than the construction of an elaborate game? What use is a proof that is established by re-purposing certain aspects of language? When I can create a logically coherent system which can 'prove' X, what is established beyond the fact that my system can 'prove' X?

jifrock wrote:Well you're not wrong. I was just looking at some stuff on modal logic - I stopped before I had a stroke.

Jim, a question for you - There are three but the real question is the first one you come too. The others are rhetorical. Because I could.

You said that "his conclusions do necessarily follow from the premises" - so I guess that the means the argument is 'valid' within the given modal system. Putting aside the ultimate truth or falsehood of Gödel's argument for a moment; what I don't understand is the relevance of 'proofs' like this have for the every-man.

We take a language. We define certain word meanings. We construct a set of rules about how words operate and interact with each other. What has been achieved other than the construction of an elaborate game? What use is a proof that is established by re-purposing certain aspects of language? When I can create a logically coherent system which can 'prove' X, what is established beyond the fact that my system can 'prove' X?

i think the answer that a logician would give is that we have good reason to think that the axioms used in such systems accurately reflect reality. of course, there are some who challenge this. in fact, there are some philosophers who have taken issue with godel's proofs for this very reason. the problem with that is that, in general, we really do seem to think that we can arrive at true conclusions using such a system. in that sense, such logical systems are descriptive, so that by using them we can have confidence in the conclusions at which we arrive.
this is just a tough issue that creeps into a number of other issues, e.g. truth, realism, etc.
the bottom line is that people who buy into such systems don't think it's just an "elaborate game." they think they're tapping into something about the way the world works.

politas wrote:

Oh, and this was supposed to go into "Counter-Apologetics", which I though was a sub-forum, rather than a single thread.

No problem! It's been transported.

NedStark wrote:



Even if this were a sound argument for something "out there," it would only prove deism. WLC is a Christian apologist, so even if he did make a coherent argument for the existence of God, it would still be a logical leap to say "MGB exists because of A, B, C, and D, therefore MGB is Jesus Christ, who just happens to be the God I already worship, fancy that."

Wouldn't this be more of a proof argument for panentheism than deism? The argument is making the case that God is imaginary but also more than imaginary which reminds me of the belief that God is the universe but also encompasses it.

Neon Genesis wrote:

NedStark wrote:



Even if this were a sound argument for something "out there," it would only prove deism. WLC is a Christian apologist, so even if he did make a coherent argument for the existence of God, it would still be a logical leap to say "MGB exists because of A, B, C, and D, therefore MGB is Jesus Christ, who just happens to be the God I already worship, fancy that."

Wouldn't this be more of a proof argument for panentheism than deism? The argument is making the case that God is imaginary but also more than imaginary which reminds me of the belief that God is the universe but also encompasses it.

I tend to look at it that way, yes. Panentheism, as I understand it, posits that god is a creative force, and the universe and all within it is a physical extension of him/it. So even if (in some fantasy land) the case for something "out there" was solid, it's still quite a leap to say it's a conscious creator deity, let alone the god of Abraham.

as weird as it is, there are subcategories of deism that combine pantheism and panentheism, namely pandeism and panendeism. as far as how that works, say for pandesim, how a conscious, creative force creates the universe by becoming it, and, in the process, becomes unconscious and unresponsive, a pantheistic god, is beyond me. people believe some really, really weird stuff.

politas wrote:I'd really like to hear you guys deconstruct Gödel's ontological proof. Explain what it says and why it's not compelling. I mean, there are a few things I use to argue against the general ontological argument as William Lane Craig puts it:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Craig claims that "a maximally great being" is intuitively coherent, but I disagree. You can only ever have a subjectively great entity according to some arbitrary set of measurements. For instance, why is this maximally great being not maximally content, thus having no impetus to create anything?

But when it gets to Gödel's formalised version, I'm left without the tools to address it, or even really understand it. I'd like to hear what you guys have to say about it.

EDIT: Oh, and if you mention me, Canberra is pronounced "kan-bruh".

Oh, and this was supposed to go into "Counter-Apologetics", which I though was a sub-forum, rather than a single thread.

I think you're right that a persons belief is subjective. That's getting it right down to the bare bones. Without rational confirmation and scientific confirmation of an idea, it's simply that (an idea). If one chooses to believe in an unconfirmed idea, it does not change the credibility of that belief and scrutiny will surely be it's logical downfall when talked about in a public forum. However the more people that believe this idea, the more difficult it is to convince a diverse public forum the majority of them are wrong. This is the problem we are getting on Youtube, and elsewhere. The Christians ignorant enough to enter conversation to confirm their beliefs are destroyed by a select few hundred Atheists who fill the comment boxes, rate the videos, and post video replies by the dozen. The alternative these Christians have is 1. Stand the heat in the kitchen and keep on cookin' 2. Leave 3. Censor comments and ratings to keep their egos intact

I'm trailing. My point is because these apologists or evangelists for God usually censor your comments, we can't have an open forum discussion. Because we can't have a discussion properly the religious win in their initial goal of strengthening their faith by finding belief systems on Youtube that are similar to their own.

Check out the users Thunderf00t and Ubergossen on www.youtube.com They are highly respected by their peers.

Why don't you discuss how there is no historical evidence of Jesus, 'cause the brilliant catholic church banned any non-religious knowledge. And how in the bible X never establishes an authority on Earth, and how the church is more of an arbitrary invention of Saint Paul rather than illumination from X. I mean X never founded a church or collected any money unlike many contemporary priests.
What about the inventions of St Augustine of Hipo to fit in the, now obsolete, aristotelian logic and philosophy to understand and explain god. Of course once Galileo and Newton proofed Aristotle's theories wrong, the lie was already pretty built up.

I'd like to hear you guys address Anthony Flew and his book, There is No A God. I'd like to hear what you think about the book and its arguments, and also what you think about the circumstances and controversy surrounding it. From what I understand, Anthony Flew is a semi-famous atheist philosopher who became convinced by the evidence for intelligent design and became (at best) a deist. It's being trumpeted by Christians as a major blow to atheism, despite the fact that Flew is still hostile to many of the basic tenets of Christianity. The book was co-written with Roy Varghese, who some (including PZ Myers) claim ghost-wrote the book and took advantage of Flew's declining mental state.

Anyway, I enjoy your guys' show immensely; it's what got me listening to podcasts (by now quite a few of them), but yours is still my favorite. Thanks for all your hard work, especially Doctor-Professor Luke Galen, who is pure comedy gold. I feel dirty for every one of your jokes I laugh at, but still I laugh.

So is everyone certain that Craig never defined God at some point in his career? Are you sure about that?

If I may add: As for the Roy-Varghese-ghost-writing-Anthony-Flew's book claim, Anthony Flew came out in print and in person to deny the allegations:

http://www.bethinking.org/science-christianity/intermediate/flew-speaks-out-professor-antony-flew-reviews-the-god-delusion.htm

“My name is on the book and it represents exactly my opinions. I would not have a book issued in my name that I do not 100 per cent agree with. I needed someone to do the actual writing because I’m 84 and that was Roy Varghese’s role. The idea that someone manipulated me because I’m old is exactly wrong. I may be old but it is hard to manipulate me. That is my book and it represents my thinking.”

Video:

https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x888qi_discussion-habermas-flew-and-wright_school

(You might need to watch all 3 parts to hear him - in his own words and voice - discuss the point.)

Another point of discussion: Is it not odd to claim that "no one can know everything"? Does not the statement refute itself? Why or why not?

Thanks for any responses...

j wrote:So is everyone certain that Craig never defined God at some point in his career? Are you sure about that?

He certainly doesn't define God (or a precise definition of "maximally great") when he posts his version of the Ontological argument, as far as I have seen. If you can find any place where Craig does so, please post a link to it.

j wrote:Another point of discussion: Is it not odd to claim that "no one can know everything"? Does not the statement refute itself? Why or why not?

No, because not knowing everything is not the same as knowing nothing.

Apostecstatic wrote:I'd like to hear you guys address Anthony Flew and his book...

A small quibble: It's Antony Flew